Abstract
Introduction
With the advent of e-commerce and the rapid development of third-party logistics, more and more brand suppliers have began to set up direct sales by introducing internet channel. Such as IBM, HP, Nike, Dell and so on. Supplier sell products both through traditional retail and internet channel to customers, customers may choose the channel that is better suited to their needs, some of them may switch to another channel to buy product when a stock-out occurs in their favorite channel. Such a distribution model is called dual-channel supply chain distribution. It can increase the share of market, and know the more demand information for supplier, and can improve the brand competitiveness of product for sale.
In the stock-out based substitution dual-channel supply chain, there exist vertical and horizontal competition simultaneously between supplier and retailer (see Figure 1) . Specifically, vertical competition mainly relates to the price double marginalization [1] . And horizontal competition mainly comes from that supplier and retailer sell the same product, and exists the competition in product inventory [2] [3] [4] .
Anupindi and Ryzin studied the situation of vertical and horizontal competition coexist in a dual-channel supply chain [5] [6] , the result showed that when the two competition coexist, the inefficient understocking because of vertical competition can be counteracted by the overstocking due to horizontal competition in a supply chain, and help to improve the supply chain's performance. But the above researches are all assumed that supplier have no inventories, so the study results have some boundedness; Chiang W.K. and Kumar mainly studied the pricing policy and service coordination of dual-channel supply chain [7] [8] ; Kevin 
Model Description

Model Assumption
The paper focus on the supply chain model with a single product in electronic and retail channel, only a supplier and a retailer in system, the supplier sets up the electronic channel, and the retailer manages the retail channel, the market consists of two kinds of customers: one is prefers the retail channel (is called as retail customers), the other is prefers the direct channel (is called as direct customers).
The product demand process { ( ), 0} N t t  follows Poisson process with parameter  , the proportion of direct customers is  ( 01   ).
The supplier has no fixed ordering cost, and implements one-for-one ordering policy to replenish inventory, when a product demand reaches, a replenishment order will be send out immediately, the information lead time of replenishment is zero.
The retailer has a certain fixed ordering cost, and implements ( , ) QR ordering policy to replenish inventory, once inventory level reaches reorder point R, a replenishment order will be send out by supplier immediately, the economic ordering quantity is Q, and the information lead time of replenishment is zero.
The base-stock level of supplier is S .
When the retailer's replenishment arrives, if the supplier's inventory level cannot meet the retailer's economic ordering quantity Q, supplier will stock up priority to retailer, and on account of ordering costs; the supplier will deliver goods in lot size Q.
There exist lost sales, once a stock-out occurs in the retailer, a proportional
of retailer customers will switch to electronic channel to buy products, otherwise, once a stock-out occurs in the supplier, a proportional
to retail channel to buy products. If a stock-out occurs in each distribution channel, customers who are unwilling to switch to the other channel to buy products will result in lost sales. In addition, when the supplier and the retailer are out of stock simultaneously, the customers will lose. The replenishment lead time of supplier and retailer are independent exponential random variables with parameters 
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The reorder point of retailer is no-negative, that is to say 0 R  , when a lot size Q arrive, the on-hand inventory level will always above the reorder point R, so in a period of lead time, the retailer only has a lot size Q, this avoid the problem of crossed contract. In addition, this assumption guarantees the ordering goods in succession, and generates random lead time [10] .
Model Establishment
We set up the profit model of supply chain by the Markov process. According to assumption 1, we first obtain the following theorem. 
Then we can obtain the following transition rates: (2)- (6) into (1), and sorting them, we can get the following linear equations system: S Q R at will, we can work out the vector of steady-state probabilities
For example, given ( , , ) (2,1,0) S Q R  , the corresponding 
The Steady-state Sales Volume and Inventory Volume
Suppose that the system operates over an infinite horizon. The supplier sells the product to the retailer at a per unit wholesale price w and to customers at a fixed marginal price d through its own direct channel. The costs incurred by the supplier for each unit of the product 
sold through the retail channel and the direct channel are 
The steady-state expected inventory volumes of supplier and retailer are: 
The steady-state expected wholesale volume of retailer is:
3. The Profit of Supply Chain
The Centralized Supply Chain
Suppose that all the prices are competitively determined, and all the cost-related parameters are exogenous, the decision variables in the system are ,, S Q R , so the steady-state expected profit for the whole supply chain can be modeled as:
(15) In the centralized supply chain, the goal is to find ,, S Q R , and maximize the whole supply chain's profit.
We have the following theorem: Theorem 2. There exists stock levels , 
The Decentralized Supply Chain
In the decentralized supply chain, the supplier and the retailer are all independent decision makers, the goal is maximize their own profits, ignoring the collective impact on the supply chain as a whole, so the profits of supplier and retailer are 
MATLAB simulation
In order to study the profit of supply chain, we designed the MATLAB program, firstly we find the state transition rate matrix The computed result can see Table 1 and Table 2 . 1  2  3  4  5   0  193  244  260  255  235  1  362  370  349  313  265  2  462  450  389  320  247  3  474  467  391  293  196  4  393  409  342  236  119  5  241  281  232  140  20  6 48 104 71 -6 -110 Table 1 is the profit ( , ,0) SQ  of centralized supply chain when S and Q take different values, respectively, it can be seen from Table 1 that when ( , ,0) SQ take values (3,1,0), the supply chain earns the maximum profit, the profit is 474. So (3,1,0) is the optimal inventory level of centralized supply chain. Figure 3) , we can find out the Nash Equilibrium point is (2,1,0), the corresponding profits of supply chain are 318 and 145, respectively. See Table 2 . It can be seen from the above MATLAB simulation that there exists base-stock levels to maximize the profit of supply chain for supplier and retailer. But the optimal profit of supply chain system in the centralized decision-making is greater than the sum of supplier and retailer's profit in Nash Equilibrium. In the double action of vertical and horizontal 
Competition Analysis
Effect of Double Marginalization
In the dual-channel supply chain, there exists vertical competition between supplier and retailer, it is mainly relates to double marginalization of price, we first analysis the effect of double marginalization to the efficiency of supply chain.
In Table 3 , the proportion of direct customers  take values from 0 to 1 with step value 0.25, the coefficient  of double marginalization take values from 0 to 1 with step value 0.2, in order to measure the channel efficiency, we introduce the competition penalty function [11] : , , ) Table 1 are used, similarly hereinafter; 3. Shaded area indicates that the competitive base-stock levels perform at the optimal level in equilibrium.
In (17), ( , , ) S Q R     denotes the maxim profit of centralized supply chain, ( , , ) (18) we know that the more of competition penalty, the lower of channel efficiency. In Table 3 , the competitive stock levels in equilibrium, the optimal stock levels and the corresponding competition penalty are reported for each  and . We first make the following observation:
Result 1. With a low proportion of direct customers, increasing the degree of double marginalization intensifies understock behavior of the whole channel, increases the competition penalty, and thus decreases the efficiency of supply chain.
Result 2. For any given  , increase the rate of direct customers will result in the lower competition penalty, and thus increases the efficiency of supply chain.
The Combined Effect of Vertical and Horizontal Competition
In the above 5.1 discussion, we assume that 0 rd   , that is to say, we left out of the consideration of horizontal competition, next we discuss the combine effect of vertical and horizontal competition on channel efficiency. 
Figure. 4. Competition Penalty of Supply Chain
Firstly, we consider the symmetric condition of stock-out based substitution rate, that is rd   , we study that when the stock-out based substitution rate co-exists with double marginalization, the effect of stock-out based substitution rate on channel efficiency. In Table 4 ), and examine the effect of increasing stock-out based substitution rate rd   simultaneously, the outcome can see Table 4 and Figure 4 , we can get the following conclusion by analysis:
Result3. Increase the stock-out based substitution rates of direct and retail customers simultaneously, when the degree of double marginalization is high, diminishes the competition penalty, when the degree of double marginalization is low, intensifies the competition penalty. Result 3 provides the combine effect of vertical and horizontal competition on supply chain under the condition rd   , in fact, when sock out occurs in some distribution channel, the stock out substitution rates are not identical in general case, so the asymmetric condition of stock out substitution rates deserve further study. Table 5, Table 6 and Figure 5 give the individual effect of Result 4. When the degree of double marginalization is low, increasing the substitution rate of supplier or retailer will intensify the competition penalty, and diminish the efficiency of supply chain. While the degree of double marginalization is moderate or high, increasing the substitution rate of supplier or retailer will diminish the competition penalty, and improve the efficiency of supply chain.
Given the above Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 , we have the following conclusion: Result 5. In the centralized supply chain, the supplier and retailer can adjust the basedstock levels timely to different stock-out based substitution rate and benefit from it, but as independent decision makers in the decentralized supply chain, the supplier and retailer are more inattentive to customers' stock-out based substitution rate, therefore will result in greater competition penalty, and prone to lose their benefits. 
Conclusions
With the gradual maturity of e-commerce and the rapid development of third-party logistics, more and more enterprises have began to set up direct sales by introducing Internet channel. This paper studied the product availability in a dual-channel supply chain with ( , ) QR policy of retailer. According to the analysis of base stock level and efficiency of supply chain, we obtained some important insights: the centralized supply chain is sensitive to customers' stock-out based substitution rate, it can adjust the based-stock levels timely and benefit from stock-out based substitution rate, while the decentralized supply chain is more prone to influenced by stock-out based substitution rate, and leads to the inefficiency of supply chain.
In this paper, we assumed that the supplier adopt one for one ordering policy, if the supplier also adopts ( , ) QR policy, then the product availability problem of supply chain will be more complex, it deserves further discussion.
